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Throughout its history, the United States has demonstrated an ability to effect regime 
change through the use of special warfare, particularly clandestine and covert operations. 
However, these regime changes have failed to yield favorable, enduring strategic results 
for the United States. One reason for this failure can be attributed to the difficulty 
formulating a strategic narrative designed to elicit domestic and international support. 
Drawing from the tenets of social movement theory, this thesis examines the cases of the 
Iran Coup of 1953, the Guatemalan Coup of 1954, and the Nicaragua Revolution of 
1978–1990 to analyze the impacts of operations aimed at shaping the perceptions of 
foreign target audiences in support of special warfare objectives. Furthermore, this thesis 
offers recommendations regarding the requisite means and organizational forms required 
to create strategic narratives that support influence operations in cases of regime change 
and other special warfare operations. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL WARFARE ................................................1 
B. CONTROLLING THE POPULATION ........................................................2 
C. MASTER NARRATIVES ...............................................................................3 
D. INITIATE AND/OR SUSTAIN MOVEMENTS ..........................................4 
E. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY ................................................................5 
F. REGIME CHANGE ........................................................................................6 
G. RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS DESIGN ......................................7 
1. Hypotheses ............................................................................................7 
2. Case Studies ..........................................................................................7 
II. IRAN .............................................................................................................................9 
A. SYNOPSIS ........................................................................................................9 
B. IRANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 
COUP ..............................................................................................................11 
C. IRANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE UNTED STATES AFTER THE 
COUP ..............................................................................................................13 
D. APPLICATION OF SMT TO THE COUP D’EAT OF 1953 ....................14 
1. Leadership ..........................................................................................14 
2. Ideological Packaging and Frames and Framing ...........................16 
3. Resource Mobilization .......................................................................18 
4. Opportunism and Adaptation ...........................................................19 
5. Presence, Tactics and Deeds..............................................................20 
E. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES ............................................................21 
III. GUATEMALA ...........................................................................................................23 
A. SYNOPSIS ......................................................................................................23 
B. GUATEMALAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
PRIOR TO THE COUP ................................................................................29 
C. GUATEMALAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AFTER THE COUP ......................................................................................30 
D. APPLICATION OF SMT TO GUATEMALA ...........................................31 
1. Leadership ..........................................................................................31 
2. Ideological Packaging ........................................................................32 
3. Frames and Framing .........................................................................34 
4. Resource Mobilization .......................................................................35 
5. Opportunism and Adaptation ...........................................................37 
6. Presence, Tactics and Deeds..............................................................37 
E. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESIS .............................................................38 
IV. NICARAGUA .............................................................................................................41 
A. SYNOPSIS ......................................................................................................41 
B. NICARAGUAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
PRIOR TO THE COUP ................................................................................46 
 viii 
C. NICARAGUAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AFTER THE COUP ......................................................................................46 
D. APPLICATION OF SMT TO NICARAGUA .............................................49 
1. Leadership ..........................................................................................49 
2. Ideological Packaging ........................................................................50 
3. Frames and Framing .........................................................................50 
4. Resource Mobilization .......................................................................51 
5. Opportunism and Adaptation ...........................................................52 
6. Presence, Tactics and Deeds..............................................................53 
E. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES ............................................................54 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................57 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................57 
B. LESSONS LEARNED ...................................................................................57 
1. Leadership ..........................................................................................57 
2. Ideology ...............................................................................................57 
3. Framing ...............................................................................................58 
4. Resource Mobilization .......................................................................58 
5. Opportunism and Adaptation ...........................................................58 
6. Presence, Tactics and Deeds..............................................................58 
7. Other Factors .....................................................................................59 
C. HYPOTHESES ..............................................................................................59 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................60 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH ..................................................................................60 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................63 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AOIC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
DOD Department of Defense 
FSLN Sandinista National Liberation Front 
InterArmco International Armament Company 
IO information operations 
MISO Military Information Support Operations 
NSDD National Security Decision Directive 
OSS Office of Strategic Service 
PSYOP Psychological Operations 
SAVAK Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar 
SIS Secret Intelligence Service 
SMT social movement theory 
SOF Special Operations Forces 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to express our deepest gratitude and appreciation to our advisor, 
Dr. Hy Rothstein, for his infinite patience, stalwart professionalism, profound expertise, 
and meticulous guidance throughout the writing of this work. We would also like to 
thank Doowan Lee for his brilliant insights and unique expertise in some very complex 
subjects. We have learned a lot, developed a much greater appreciation for academia, and 
become better writers and researchers because of these two stellar professors. 
 xii 




A. UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL WARFARE 
If there is anything that United States has learned from its recent conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, it is this: the opposition is choosing to engage the United States with 
unconventional methods of war and the United States has too often been unprepared to 
fight back unconventionally. According to John R. Schindler, a professor of national 
security affairs at the Naval War College, “We can expect a gradual move away from the 
high-intensity warfare that the United States has perfected in the tactical-operational 
realm.”1  He reasons that, with the noted possible exception of China, the rest of the 
world “appears uninterested in fighting the United States the way the United States likes 
to fight.”2  As a result of the changing and adaptive tactics and strategy of the opposition, 
and problematic recent results, the United States is now emphasizing the use of special 
warfare. 
Special warfare is defined as “the execution of activities that involve a 
combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated 
force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign languages, proficiency in 
small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat 
formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.”3  Special warfare 
encapsulates the full spectrum of special operations, including unconventional warfare, 
foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency.4  As such, one can deduce that special 
warfare requires deep interaction with the population of an operating environment; and 
special warfare can allow military forces to conduct operations outside the normal scope 
                                                 
1 Michael P. Noonan, “Can the U.S. Fight the Wars of the Future?” U.S. News & World Report, 
September 20, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/09/20/the-us-defense-
budget-and-the-growing-popularity-of-special-war. 
2 Ibid. 
3 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05: Special Operations (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 9. 
4 Ibid. 
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of traditional military activities, such as shaping perceptions of a population so as to 
obtain their support for regime change. 
B. CONTROLLING THE POPULATION 
If the population is the center of gravity in a special warfare environment, then 
controlling the population is paramount. For example, in “Special Forces and the Art of 
Influence: A Grassroots Approach to Psychological Operations in an Unconventional 
Warfare Environment,” Joel W. Thomas II claims the ability to control the population is 
the critical factor for success in unconventional warfare, which is a subset of special 
warfare.5  The reason is that the faction that controls the population often does it on the 
basis of an information advantage.6  This information advantage allows the controlling 
faction to dictate the terms of special warfare to its benefit. 
In “Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach,” authors Edward M. 
Lopacienski, William M. Grieshaber, Bradley M. Carr, and Carson S. Hoke argue that 
influence operations are vital in controlling the population in an unconventional warfare 
operating environment.7  These men advocate that decisive influence operations are 
predicated on the following concepts: messages and deeds, channels, and mediums. 
Messages and deeds must resonate with the population to be credible; channels are the 
people who can facilitate the dissemination of information broadly and quickly within the 
population; and mediums are the means used by the channels to express the message.8 
Although these concepts are the core of decisive influence operations, the 
messages and deeds concept is the most important. The reason is that messages provide 
the ideas for a population to rally behind, and deeds are the actions that support and 
reinforce those messages. In “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block 
                                                 
5 Joel W. Thomas II, “Special Forces and the Art of Influence: A Grassroots Approach to 
Psychological Operations in an Unconventional Warfare Environment” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), 2. 
6 Point taken from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s Seminar in Guerilla Warfare, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2012. 
7 Edward M. Lopacienski et al., “Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 1–2, 15–18. 
8 Ibid., 15–18. 
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War,” Gen. Charles C. Krulak argues there is a three-block war concept: hand out 
humanitarian supplies; separate warring factions; and fight adversaries.9 In “Future 
Warfare and the Rise of Hybrid Wars,” LtGen. James N. Mattis and LtCol. (Retired) 
Frank G. Hoffman of the United States Marine Corps build upon Gen Krulak’s three-
block concept by recognizing an additional dimension in which information operations 
are used to gain popular support and consent.10 
According to Mattis and Hoffman, 
Our actions in the three other blocks are important to building our 
credibility and establishing relationships with the population and their 
leadership. Thus, there is an information operations aspect within each 
block … The information operations component is how we extend our 
reach and how we can influence populations to reject the misshaped 
ideology and hatred they are offered by the insurgents.11 
Thus, it can be argued that the key to shaping perceptions within a special warfare 
environment is to have a message with supporting actions. 
C. MASTER NARRATIVES 
While the key to controlling the population is through influence operations, one 
first needs to unify the population so they can be controlled. The tool to unify the 
population is through a master narrative. 
Master narratives create the reason to join or support a cause or to leave one cause 
for another, often becoming the rallying cry for a social movement. Master narratives are 
“historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or 
explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns.”12  Master narratives provide a unifying 
                                                 
9 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine 
28, no. 1 (1999): 26–33. 
10 James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, “Future Warfare and the Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 
Proceedings 132, no. 11 (2005): 18–19. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Open Source Center and Monitor 360, Master Narratives Country Report: Syria (Reston, VA: Open 
Source Center, 2012), 6. 
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sense of community and can be the difference between the success and failure of a social 
movement.13  Given this assertion, constructing a proper master narrative is critical. 
Framing is another critical factor that must be taken into consideration. Framing 
theory posits that a perspective inside a message can influence the response of an 
individual.14  It is argued that the success of a mobilization, within and across 
movements, is dependent upon how one frames the mobilization.15  For example, the al-
Qaeda movement can be viewed as unsuccessful with nonviolent Islamic fundamentalists 
because al-Qaeda has had difficulties framing the permissible use of violence.16  Framing 
the argument for a master narrative is dependent on three devices: diagnostic (identifying 
a problem and attributing blame or causality); prognostic (suggesting solutions to a 
problem and identifying strategies, tactics, and targets); and motivational (elaborating a 
call to arms or rationale for action).17 
D. INITIATE AND/OR SUSTAIN MOVEMENTS 
For a message to have any effective influence, it must be supplemented by 
action.18  There are two types of action that can mobilize a population. The first catalyst 
is violent action. The catalyst for the Arab Spring is an example of violent action.19  
When Mohammed Bouazizi committed an act of self-immolation, he launched a 
revolutionary social movement that led to the downfall of four dictators, one civil war, 
and a multitude of government changes throughout northern Africa and the Middle East. 
The second catalyst is nonviolent action. An example of nonviolent action would be the 
                                                 
13 Open Source Center and Monitor 360, Country Report: Syria, 6. 
14 Robin L. Nabi, “Exploring the Framing Effects of Emotion: Do Discrete Emotions Differentially 
Influence Information Accessibility, Information Seeking, and Policy Preference?” Communication 
Research 30, no. 2 (2003), 225. 
15 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1, no. 1 (1988), 199. 
16 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Struggle 
for Sacred Authority,” International Review of Social History 49 (2004), 159. 
17 Snow and Benford, “Ideology,” 200–202. 
18 Lopacienski et al., “Influence Operations,” 16. 
19 Kareem Fahim, “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia,” New York Times, January 21, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&src=twrhp&. 
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endeavors of M.K. Gandhi. Beginning with the Salt March, Gandhi led and sustained a 
social movement through the application of nonviolent civil resistance that ended with 
India and Great Britain becoming equals.20 
E. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
In special warfare, controlling the population is the definitive factor for success. 
The key to controlling the population is influence operations, with the foundation for 
control being the ability to craft a master narrative to unite the movement and followed 
by the supporting actions to sustain the movement. However, such a movement requires 
an ability to transcend individual grievances yet harness the power of individuals to form 
a singular entity. The key to this dilemma may lie within the theoretical framework of 
social movement theory (SMT). 
In Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, 
SMT is defined as “an interdisciplinary field of research that concerns itself with 
describing and explaining the dynamics of movements—including social movements.”21 
A social movement is defined as “collective challenges by people with common purposes 
and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.”22  At the 
heart of SMT is the belief that social movements are used to generate public support for 
an idea. Furthermore, it is argued that public support is dependent on four factors: 
motivation for supporting a group or cause; perceived legitimacy of methods; 
acceptability of costs and risks; and availability of a mobilizing mechanism.23 
Understanding how resistance groups garner public support requires an understanding of 
how groups frame their images and ideologies.24  SMT provides that understanding. 
                                                 
20 Gene Sharp, “Introduction to Part One,” in The Politics of Nonviolent Action–Part One: Power and 
Struggle, ed. Marina Finkelstein (Manchester, NH: Porter Sargent and Extending Horizon Books, 2012), 5. 
21 Paul K. Davis et al., Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 16. 
22 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. 
23 Davis et al., Understanding and Influencing, 15. 
24 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986), 464. 
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The RAND publication lists six elements that aid in the understanding of 
mobilization of public support.25  The first element, leadership, requires the development 
of strategies to promote the goals and objectives of the group based on changing 
environmental circumstances.26  The second element, ideological packaging, creates the 
narrative for the group.27  The third element, frames and framing, creates group identities 
and exploits grievances.28  The fourth element, resource mobilization, seeks to expand 
and control resources to exploit or develop social networks and other structures to further 
the cause.29  The fifth element, opportunism and adaptation, relates a group’s strategy to 
the realities outside of the movement.30  The sixth and final element, presence, tactics and 
deeds, describes the necessary conduct for actions that reinforce the message.31  These 
six elements will provide the foundation for understanding how to mobilize the 
population against the regime in power in special warfare. 
F. REGIME CHANGE 
The United States’ attempts at regime change often do not turn out as favorably as 
intended. In Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, 
Stephen Kinzer states, “When the United States assumes the right to decide which 
regimes pose urgent threats, and then acts violently to crush them, it destabilizes the 
world rather than stabilizes it.”32 The United States tends to use regime change as “a 
substitute for thoughtful foreign policy.”33  Due to the United States’ inability to create 
an effective master narrative, and actions to support it, the United States often finds itself 
in a political quagmire. 
                                                 
25 Davis, et al, Understanding and Influencing, 17–22. 
26 Ibid., 17–19. 
27 Ibid., 19. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 20. 
30 Ibid., 21. 
31 Ibid., 21–22. 
32 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: 
Times Books, Henry Holt, 2006), 320. 
33 Ibid. 
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G. RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS DESIGN 
This thesis asks the following research question: How can the U.S. military shape 
perceptions of foreign target audiences to support special warfare objectives? 
1. Hypotheses 
 H1: The ideology behind the anti-regime must be broadly accepted and 
perceived as legitimate. 
 H2: The ability to control perception is dependent on the ability to 
leverage existing grievances and exploit regime vulnerabilities. 
 H3: Information-shaping operations should precede major combat 
operations against the regime. 
 H4: Information operations (IO) should target respected host nation 
communicators who are willing and capable of the disseminating the 
themes. 
 H5: The legitimacy of the enemy’s narrative must be undermined. 
2. Case Studies 
To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, this thesis will examine 
the following case studies in Chapters II–IV: 
 The Iran Coup of 1953. 
 The Guatemala Coup of 1954. 
 The Nicaragua Revolution, 1978–1990. 
These case studies were chosen because they highlight the successes and failures of 
the United States’ ability to influence the local population to support a regime change 
through the use of messaging and supporting actions. 
Each case study will be examined in the following manner: 
 A Brief Synopsis. 
 Target Nation Perceptions prior to Attempted Regime Change. 
 Target Nation Perceptions after Attempted Regime Change. 
 Application of the Elements of Social Movement Theory. 
 Testing of the Hypotheses. 
The final chapter, Chapter V, concludes with a summary of the research findings, 
recommendations for applying the research, and suggestions for further study. 
  
 8 





The primary motivation behind the Iranian Coup d’Etat of 1953 was arguably 
ensuring access to oil. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) had an arrangement with 
Iran that gave the conglomerate control over all oil operations in southern Iran.34  
According to the arrangement, AIOC paid rent, taxes and salaries of Iranian employees.35  
Though this money constituted half of Iran’s gross national product, AOIC paid more to 
the British government and the AOIC earned ten times the amount it paid Iran.36  As 
early as 1947, and prior to his ascension to prime minister, Mohammad Mossadeq 
rejected an oil deal with the Soviets and sought a more favorable deal for Iran with the 
AIOC.37  In fact, Mossadeq and the Majlis, the parliament of Iran, wanted a deal similar 
to what the United States had with Saudi Arabia.38  The British refused and Iran made a 
move to nationalize Iranian oil.39  On April 30, 1951, Mossadeq became the Prime 
Minister of Iran. On May 1, 1951, Mossadeq officially nationalized Iranian oil.40 
No longer viewing Iran as a willing partner with Mossadeq at the helm, the 
British led a Western-power-backed boycott of Iranian oil. This boycott had a crippling 
effect on the Iranian economy. Furthermore, the British approached the United States 
with a plan to overthrow Mossadeq. President Truman thought it unwise to overthrow 
Mossadeq, favoring diplomacy to resolve the matter between the AIOC and Iran.41  
When Eisenhower came into office, he attempted to avoid issues involving the conflict 
between the British and the Iranians. When he did intervene, he often sided with the 
                                                 
34 John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II 
through the Persian Gulf War (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), 92. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 38. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 39. 
41 Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, 93. 
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British. As internal strife within the Iranian government grew due to a failing economy, 
Mossadeq reached out to Eisenhower seeking financial aid. However, Eisenhower 
refused to provide assistance. Instead, he authorized Operation Ajax. 
Operation Ajax was the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) and the Secret 
Intelligence Service’s (SIS) covert operation to overthrow Mossadeq. The operation 
primarily “focused on getting the Iranian army to back the Shah against Mossadeq,” 
through the use of an extensive psychological warfare campaign designed to discredit the 
legitimacy of Mossadeq.42  The desired end-state of Operation Ajax was to reestablish 
the power of the Shah, resolve the oil crisis with the British, and create a fiscally 
responsible and anti-communist government.43 
There were two coup attempts during Operation Ajax. The first attempt did not go 
well. Nemotallah Nasiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard, attempted to arrest 
Mossadeq after the decree from the Shah sometime during August 14–15. However, 
Mossadeq had learned of the coup and had Nasiri arrested.44  On August 16, pro-
Mossadeq forces took control of the city and Radio Tehran announced the coup had been 
stopped.45 
Although the outcome looked bleak, and the CIA was ready to give up, the second 
attempt succeeded. Why did the second attempt succeeded?  Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA 
officer in charge of the coup, and General Zahedi were not ready to give in to the dire 
situation. They met on the morning of August 16 to discuss a course of action. The 
conspirators decided to publicize the Shah’s decrees.46  Kermit Roosevelt had the CIA 
contact the Associated Press to announce the Shah’s actions, which were eventually 
                                                 
42 Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, 95. 
43 Donald N. Wilber, Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 
1952–August 1953 (Nottingham, England: Spokesman, 2006), 13. 
44 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’État Against Mosaddeq,” in Mohammad Mosaddeq and 
the 1953 Coup in Iran, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 2004), 249. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 251. 
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broadcast by Iranian media.47  Attempting to drum up support for Zahedi, U.S military 
advisors provided aid, such as medical supplies and military gear, to Iranian military 
forces.48  The CIA also financed a protesting mob under the guise of Tudeh supporters, 
which caused actual Tudeh members to join the demonstration.49  Military personnel and 
civilians would clash over the next couple of days, culminating with the destruction of 
Mossadeq’s house on August 19. On August 20, Mossadeq surrendered to General 
Zahedi. 
B. IRANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO COUP 
Throughout the 1940s, the Iranian public largely embraced American culture. 
American music and movies became commonplace, with many Hollywood stars 
becoming household names.50  Voice of America programs in Iran were very popular, 
particularly trivia and call-in talk shows.51  As the Iranian public’s love affair with 
American culture progressed, so did the Iranian government’s support of the American 
government and its policies. 
A key example of the Iranian government’s favorable perception of the United 
States occurred during the Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. The Soviets sponsored two 
autonomous republics within Iran—the Azerbaijan People’s Republic and the Kurdish 
Republic of Mahabad. Furthermore, the Soviets also had forces remaining in Iran after 
the expiration of the Tripartite Agreement.52  Seeking the removal of Soviet forces from 
the areas, Tehran turned to Washington for assistance. Exerting political pressure through 
diplomatic means at the U.N., the United States contributed to the removal of Soviet 
                                                 
47 Gasiorowski, “1953 Coup d’État,” 251. 
48 Ibid., 252. 
49 Ibid., 252–253. 
50 Adam Cooper, “American Foreign Policy Iran: Development, Strategy, and the Rise of Anti-
Americanism,” Libertas, n.d., http://www.libertas.bham.ac.uk/publications/articles/American%20Foreign 
%20Policy%20in%20Iran.pdf. 
51 Deborah Kisatsky, “Voice of America and Iran, 1949–1953: US Liberal Developmentalism, 
Propaganda and the Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 3 (1999), 165. 
52 Mansour Bonakdarian, “U.S.–Iranian Relations, 1911–1951,” Iran Chamber Society, n.d. 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/pdfs/us_ir_1911_1951.pdf. 
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forces from Iran.53  After the Soviets departed, the United States, under President 
Truman, returned to a distant, hands-off foreign policy approach towards Iran, a move 
that the Iranian public appreciated.54  Though the Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 provides 
a positive glimpse of the United States through the Iranian eyes, the best perspective is 
through the actions of Mosaddeq himself. 
While his relationship deteriorated with the United States shortly before the coup, 
Mohammad Mosaddeq initially had a favorable view and attitude toward America.55  
Mosaddeq often relied upon the United States to serve as a mediating entity between Iran 
and Great Britain over Iran’s endeavors to nationalize its oil production.56 Indicative of 
his favorable stance toward the United States, Mosaddeq constantly sought military aid 
from the United States, though often to his own detriment.57 
Based on the actions of the Iranian people and Mossadeq, it can be determined 
that the perception of the Iranian people and the Iranian government were generally 
positive toward the United States. It is evident that the Iranian people held the United 
States in high regards via their acceptance of and affection for American culture. As for 
the Iranian government, it all started and ended with Mossadeq. Initially, he held a highly 
favorable perception of the United States. However, it waned as the United States started 
to side with the British instead of the Iranians on the nationalization of oil. Furthermore, 
Mossadeq’s threat to seek Soviet aid did not sit well with the United States. That stance 
solidified U.S. support toward the British. 
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C. IRANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE UNTED STATES AFTER THE COUP 
As the new benefactors of the regime change, the Shah and Zahedi were indebted 
to the United States. Within three weeks of the Shah and Zahedi assuming power in Iran, 
the United States immediately gave Iran $68 million dollars in emergency aid.58  Over 
the next decade, the United States would give Iran $1.2 billion in aid. Furthermore, the 
CIA would assist the Shah and Zahedi in other covert endeavors, such as slightly rigging 
the parliamentary elections of 1954 and putting down several uprisings.59 
As for the Iranian people’s perceptions of the United States, the initial response 
was favorable as well. The Iranians saw that the Americans were assisting with the 
rebuilding of the Iranian economy and government. However, over the next two decades, 
that favorable perception would begin to wane as the United States continued to support 
an increasingly dictatorial ruler.  “The Shah’s regime moved swiftly to suppress all 
opposition, imposed strict censorship on mass media, and banned all forms of political 
organization, activities, and even literary expression that it found threatening to its 
security.”60  The brutality of the Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK) 
soured many Iranians against the Shah. Many of the people that SAVAK detained were 
often tortured, which made his people hate him.61  Lastly, in 1964, Iran passed a status of 
forces agreement with the United States. Though it appeared to the United States as a 
typical operating standard, it appeared to Iranians that the government had once again 
given away sovereignty to an imperial power.62  Giving Iran a $200 million loan 
immediately after the signing of the status of forces agreement did not help matters 
either.63  Over the next thirty years, the Iranian people would come to despise Americans, 
culminating with the seizing of the U.S. Embassy in 1979. 
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After the coup, the Iranian perception of the United States was not something the 
United States had anticipated. Initially, both the Iranian people and government were 
pleased with the outcome of the coup. The Iranian people, however, grew displeased with 
the United States. Although the United States increased its financial and military support 
to Iran, it turned a blind eye to the Shah’s harsh ruling methods. Iranians began to notice 
that the United States was not on the side of the people. In the eyes of the Iranians, the 
United States had become another imperialist power violating the sovereignty of Iran.  
D. APPLICATION OF SMT TO THE COUP D’EAT OF 1953 
1. Leadership 
Donald Wilber, a former agent of the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) and the 
CIA agent responsible for the psychological campaign in Operation Ajax, said the 
following: 
By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in 
Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western 
countries; was reaching dangerous and advanced state of illegal, deficit 
financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier 
Mohammad Mossadeq’s tenure of office; was motivated mainly by 
Mossadeq’s desire for personal power; was governed by irresponsible 
policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army 
to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh 
(Communist) Party of Iran.64 
Essentially, the unstable conditions of the political environment of Iran had led United 
States officials and policy makers to perceive a Mossadeq government in Iran as one not 
in the best interests of the United States, nor Western powers, particularly the United 
Kingdom. As a result, the United States decided to act. However, the United States was 
unsure of how to proceed. The answer would come in the form of a CIA estimate. 
On April 16, 1953, the CIA completed an estimate entitled, “Factors Involved in 
the Overthrow of Mossadeq.”  The study concluded that “a Shah-General Zahedi 
combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good 
chance of overthrowing Mossadeq, particularly if this combination should be able to get 
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the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizeable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to 
carry out Mossadeq’s orders.”65 As a result of the study’s findings, the CIA determined 
that a joint venture between the British SIS and American CIA, with the Shah and 
General Zahedi as the public face of the regime change in Iran, would be the best course 
of action. 
Though the Shah and Zahedi were identified as the public leaders of the coup, the 
true leaders were the ones who developed and oversaw the execution of the strategy. The 
true leaders of the coup were Kermit Roosevelt, Donald Wilber, Norman Darbyshire, and 
George Carroll. Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, former 
OSS agent, and current CIA Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, was given the 
overall responsibility for the planning and execution of the coup.66  Donald Wilber, a 
consultant to the CIA who specialized in psychological warfare and a former OSS agent, 
was given the responsibility of leading the psychological warfare campaign of the coup.67  
Norman Darbyshire, the British SIS counterpart of Donald Wilber, brought the main SIS 
political action operation in Iran, the Rashidian Network, whose task was the 
destabilization of Iran, into the fold.68 Last, George Carroll, a CIA paramilitary expert, 
would develop the military aspect of Operation Ajax. Together, these four men would 
develop and oversee the coup. 
Operation Ajax consisted of six steps.69  First, destabilize the Mossadeq 
government with propaganda. Second, have Zahedi organize the military side of the 
coup. Third, secure the Shah’s cooperation. Fourth, use the Rashidian brothers and 
Iranian British intelligence agents, to buy support from Iran’s parliament and cause 
internal strife. Fifth, organize a massive demonstration to denounce Mossadeq and trigger 
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a parliamentary vote to dismiss him. Sixth, if that effort failed, have Zahedi and his 
military seize power. 
2. Ideological Packaging and Frames and Framing 
For the coup to have any viable support from the Iranian people, it needed to have 
a master narrative to bring the target audiences together and frames to provide cohesion. 
The master narrative focused on two major themes; that “Mossadeq was pro-Tudeh and 
anti-Islamic.”70  Under these themes, the CIA launched a black propaganda campaign 
against Mossadeq. 
The intent behind the pro-Tudeh theme was to frame Mossadeq, in the very least, 
as a pro-Communist sympathizer, causing his political support base to turn against him. 
Ervand Abrahamian, a noted expert of Middle Eastern and Iranian history, said the 
following: 
A crucial component of the plan was to highlight the supposed communist 
threat linking the Tudeh to the National Front, exaggerating its strength, 
inflating its crowds, forging documents to ‘prove’ it had infiltrated the 
government, claiming it was preparing to pull off a coup, and warning that 
Mossadeq would wittingly or unwittingly pave the way for the inevitable 
incorporation of Iran into the Soviet Bloc.71 
In The U.S. Press and Iran:  Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Difference, 
authors William A. I Dorman and Mansour Farhang write the following: 
The U.S. press was particularly hard on Mossadeq during the six months 
preceding his overthrow. The two major focal points of press coverage 
throughout this period were Mossadeq’s personal political ambitions and 
what was perceived as the increasing vulnerability to communism of Iran 
under his rule.72 
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The CIA, with the help of the Department of State, planted articles in the American press, 
which were often republished in Iran.73  In one example, Mark J. Gasiorowski, a 
professor of political science at Tulane University, conducted an interview with an 
unnamed CIA representative and learned that the CIA planted an article, titled, “Iran: 
Reds … Taking Over,” in the August 10, 1953 issue of Newsweek.74  In another example 
of reinforcing of the pro-Tudeh theme, CIA propagandists prepared and released a 
propaganda piece called, “Our National Character.”75  Though the actual release date of 
this document remains unknown, what is known is that the piece claims that the 
Mossadeq’s alliance with the Tudeh party has led to the violation of the Iranian cultural 
norm of open hospitality toward foreigners.76 
In addition to planting articles in the American press, the CIA received assistance 
in the form of public declarations from high-ranking U.S. officials, to include President 
Eisenhower, expressing grave concern over Iran’s relationship with Communism. For 
example, President Eisenhower’s speech at the Governor’s convention in Seattle stated 
that the “U.S. would not sit by and see Asian countries fall behind the Iron Curtain.”77  
At a press conference, Secretary of State John F. Dulles made clear that the United States 
was hesitant to provide aid over growing concern of the Communist influence in Iran.78  
Furthermore, in a non-verbal public declaration, Secretary Dulles “made it a special point 
of not stopping in Tehran during his grand tour of the Middle East” in early August 
1953.79 
As for the anti-Islamic theme, the CIA pulled no punches. The intent behind the 
anti-Islamic theme was to frame Mossadeq as a secularist supporter, causing his clerical 
leaders to turn against him. The CIA spread rumors that Mossadeq was of Jewish 
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ancestry.80  The CIA planted an article in the Iranian newspaper, Joshan, about 
Mossadeq’s close advisor and Foreign Affairs Minister of Iran, Hussein Fatemi.81  In the 
article, Fatemi was called a homosexual and a convert to Christianity, which were 
justifications for death in Iran. The CIA also used its Iranian agents to threaten clerical 
leaders through the use of “black phone calls” and the staging of a “bombing” at the 
home of a cleric.82  During the coup itself, the Rashidian Network, along with unnamed 
religious and bazaar leaders, used hordes of demonstrators to denounce Mossadeq as 
“anti-religious.”83 
3. Resource Mobilization 
When the CIA/SIS team developed the strategy for the coup, the team knew that it 
would require financial and logistical support to propagate the perception that Mossadeq 
was pro-Tudeh and anti-Islam and promote the perception of a need for a regime change. 
The CIA funded a $150,000 destabilization campaign.84  The destabilization 
campaign was designed to promote Mossadeq as “corrupt, pro-communist, hostile to 
Islam, and intent on destroying the morale and readiness of the armed forces.”85  With 
$135,000 allocated to him, General Zahedi “would persuade and bribe as many of his 
fellow officers as possible to stand ready for whatever military action was necessary to 
carry out the coup.”86  The team also allocated $11,000 per week to bribe members of the 
Majlis (legislature) for their support.87 
The team also exploited pre-existing resources to support the coup, TPBEDAMN 
and the Rashidian Network. Originally, TPBEDAMN was a 1940s anti-Soviet operation 
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that had Iranians translate prepared media products, such as newspaper articles and 
leaflets, into Persian with the intent of overtly and covertly countering Tudeh 
propaganda.88  The team would now use assets of TPBEDAMN to fund anti-communist 
organizations to attack Tudeh rallies and to fund denouncements of the Tudeh by Iranian 
clergymen.89  The Rashidian Network was a British intelligence network operated by 
three brothers, Seyfollah, Asadollah, and Qodratollah, who conducted subversive 
activities, such as bribing newspaper editors and political leaders on behalf of the British 
after Mossadeq forced the British to leave Iran.90  Prior to the planning of the coup, the 
Rashidian Network successfully persuaded several prominent members of the National 
Front to defect, weakening it and leaving Mossadeq open to political attack.91  The 
Rashidian Network also was responsible for the death of General Mahmoud Afshartus, 
the prominent police chief of Iran, a potential obstacle in the upcoming coup.92  Once the 
British SIS turned the Rashidian Network over to the Operation Ajax team, the Rashidian 
Network continued its subversive activities, such as using its Iranian contacts to organize 
demonstrations and marches against Mossadeq.93 
4. Opportunism and Adaptation 
Throughout the coup, the CIA demonstrated remarkable agility in a rapidly 
changing situation. At first, clerical support for the removal of Mossadeq and the vote of 
no confidence from the Iranian parliament had failed to materialize. As a result, the CIA 
had to find another means to dismiss Mossadeq. The CIA turned to the Shah to issues his 
decrees that dismissed Mossadeq and appointed Zahedi. 
After this first coup attempt failed, the CIA rallied to conduct a second attempt 
that succeeded. The CIA turned to organized political activity. CIA-sponsored crowds 
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would proceed to seize Radio Tehran and the Ministry of Press and Propaganda.94  Other 
crowds would attack the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and protest outside the Soviet 
Embassy.95 
5. Presence, Tactics and Deeds 
Much has been said about the CIA’s ability to launch subversive propaganda and 
orchestrate mass protests. The CIA often used black propaganda. The CIA posed as 
members of the Tudeh party and threatened clerical leaders who opposed Mossadeq.96  
The CIA also faked a bombing of a clerical leader’s home.97  The CIA wrote anti-
Mossadeq newspaper articles. The CIA also bribed government officials to elicit their 
support.  “As part of its ‘war of nerves’ against Mossadeq, the CIA team convinced heads 
of the U.S. economic and military assistance groups in Iran to reduce their contact with 
pro-Mossadeq officials.”98  The CIA team played upon the Iranian cultural norm of 
public protesting. However, a critical action of the coup has yet to be discussed, Major 
General Norman Schwarzkopf’s persuasion of the Shah to sign the decrees.99 
The most critical aspect of the coup was to have the Shah issue formal decrees 
dismissing Mossadeq as the Prime Minister and proclaiming General Zahedi as the new 
Prime Minister. This aspect would be the legal foundation for Zahedi’s assumption of 
power.100  However, the Shah had to be convinced that he had the support of the U.S. and 
British governments.101  At first, the plotters attempted to use Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s 
twin sister to persuade the Shah to sign the decrees. Her attempt failed and only caused 
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more consternation once word of her return to Iran was leaked. Thankfully, she returned 
to Europe quickly.102  Undeterred, Roosevelt turned to Schwarzkopf. 
MG Schwarzkopf had established rapport with the Shah, something Roosevelt 
knew and planned to exploit. Schwarzkopf, who had previously commanded the Iranian 
gendarmerie from 1942–1948 and knew the Shah personally, arrived in Iran under the 
auspices of a regional Middle Eastern tour.103  At the Saad Abad Palace on August 1, 
1953, Schwarzkopf and the Shah met to discuss the signing of the decrees.104  The Shah 
proclaimed to his friend that he was still unsure whether to sign the decrees. Schwarzkopf 
informed the Shah that there was no other solution. Though the meeting did not produce 
the desired intent, Schwarzkopf did leave feeling that the Shah needed only one more 
visit, or more accurately one more visitor, to reassure the Shah and solicit his signatures. 
Over the next few days, Roosevelt, with the assistance of Asadollah Rashidian, would 
visit the Shah to persuade him to sign the decrees, which the Shah ultimately did. 
E. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES 
After applying the factors of SMT to the Iran Coup d’Etat of 1953, it can be 
determined that the coup was a successful social movement because the agent 
provocateurs were able to shape and control the perceptions of the population to facilitate 
a regime change. First, the CIA team crafted an ideological framework that vilified 
Mossadeq as an illegitimate leader and an enemy of Iran due to his perceived stance as a 
communist and a secularist sympathizer. Second, with that framework as its foundation, 
the CIA team leveraged existing grievances and exploited regime vulnerabilities via its 
implementation of a massive black propaganda campaign prior to conducting major 
physical action. Third, the CIA team mobilized its resources, particularly the Rashidian 
Network, to target key communicators who were willing and capable of disseminating 
desired themes, such as susceptible leaders in the Majlis and the influential men of the 
local bazaars. Last, as messages and activity criticizing and discrediting the Mossadeq 
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regime grew, so did the anti-Mossadeq perception. In fact, by 1953, most leaders of the 





Jacobo Árbenz became the President of Guatemala in 1951 after serving as a 
professional military officer who rose to the rank of colonel and later became the 
Minister of Defense. President Árbenz was elected from the Revolutionary Party and 
central to his presidential mandate was land reform, specifically an agrarian reform bill 
known as Decree 900.105  The decree took uncultivated lands from plantations larger than 
672 acres, while leaving smaller farms alone. The Guatemalan Government then issued 
25-year bonds at 3% interest based on the reported value of the land to those whose lands 
were seized by the government. For some landowners, such as the United Fruit Company, 
an American corporation, this was a problem because United Fruit Company and other 
businesses “undervalued its land for years in order to reduce its tax liability.”106 
International interferences by corporations such as the United Fruit Company into 
the agrarian affairs of Guatemala influenced President Árbenz to implement his decree 
900. President Árbenz addressed the Guatemalan Congress, stating: “we face a growing 
threat of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala, placing in danger the 
stability of our constitutional life and the integrity of our national independence.”107  The 
United States, and specifically the United Fruit Company, was identified as a potential 
threat by President Árbenz. 
The United Fruit Company was operating in Guatemala well before President 
Árbenz came to office and had much invested in Guatemala. The company owned nearly 
one-fifth of Guatemala’s arable land, which was more than 550,000 acres, but only 
cultivated 15% of the land.108  Under Decree 900, the Árbenz government seized land 
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from the United Fruit Company and offered compensation based on the underreported 
value reported by the company.109  The United Fruit Company became very displeased 
with the actions of the Árbenz administration regarding land seizures and brought the 
situation to the attention of the United States government. 
The United Fruit Company also had many prominent and strategically positioned 
members and allies in the United States government. This included John Foster Dulles, 
the U.S. Secretary of State, and his brother, Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA. Both 
brothers were involved in the legal affairs of the United Fruit Company and Allen even 
owned stock. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John Moors 
Cabot, also held stock in the company. The Director of Department of State’s 
International Security Affairs, Thomas Dudley Cabot, the brother of John Moors Cabot 
had been the company’s president. The head of the National Security Council, General 
Robert Cutler, was formerly the company’s chairman of the board. Lastly, the president 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, John J. McCloy, was a 
former board member as well.110  Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his 
colleagues were determined to remove the Árbenz regime.111 
President Dwight Eisenhower took the position that President Árbenz was a 
communist and his agricultural reform was a result of his politics based on communist 
ideals. One of President Árbenz’s actions was to allow the legalization of the Communist 
Party in Guatemala, which allowed Marxists to occupy important positions in the 
Guatemalan Government including positions involving agricultural reform.112  Despite 
the political decisions and policies of Árbenz, there was no true connection between 
Guatemala and the Soviet Union, and no matter how hard the United States looked, a 
connection could not be found.113  The absence of a direct connection between 
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Guatemala and the Soviet Union did not dissuade the United States from applying the 
Truman Doctrine to Guatemala, which stated that the United States must: “support free 
people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”114  John Foster Dulles declared that it was “impossible to produce evidence 
clearly tying the Guatemalan government to Moscow”115  However, he believed leaders 
were acting against the Guatemalan government “based on the deep conviction that such 
a tie must exist”116 and therefore, the United States had to remove Árbenz and replace 
him with a cooperative leader.117  The Central Intelligence Agency was given the task of 
planning, coordinating and executing operations to depose President Árbenz.118 
After the decision was made to overthrow the Árbenz government, a suitable 
replacement had to be found who would be amenable to the needs of the United States. 
The search led the CIA to Carlos Castillo, a former Guatemalan military officer who was 
in exile after a previously failed uprising in Guatemala; he was also popular in the anti-
Árbenz movement outside of Guatemala.119  When the CIA approached Castillo to 
recruit him to become the leader of the Army of Liberation, he immediately accepted the 
offer.120 
According to the CIA, their plan for overthrowing the Árbenz regime entailed: 
cutting off military aid to Guatemala, increasing aid to its neighbors, 
exerting diplomatic and economic pressure against Arbenz and attempts to 
subvert and or defect Army and political leaders, broad scale 
psychological warfare and paramilitary actions.121 
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The training for the Castillo group took place in Nicaragua and included 85 members 
who were trained in the areas of sabotage, leadership, and support roles. An additional 
260 men were located in Honduras and El Salvador to act as shock and support troops. 
Air operations were used to bomb and attack targets as well as to move cargo and 
disseminate propaganda. The propaganda channels used against Árbenz largely relied on 
of leaflet and radio, but another channel of influence employed by the CIA against the 
Árbenz regime was getting the Roman Catholic clergy to turn their congregates against 
President Árbenz. The clergy were more in line with the ruling class of Guatemala and 
did not support reformers like President Árbenz.122 
The plan to overthrow Árbenz began with a psychological operations campaign 
that was initiated seven weeks before the actual invasion force entered Guatemala. It was 
a campaign of disinformation intended to spread fear and panic.123  The PSYOP 
campaign began in Guatemala City where leaflets were dropped by CIA aircraft and 
stated that there would be bombings unless President Árbenz quit immediately; the 
leaflets were self-attributed to the “National Liberation Front.”124  The CIA followed 
through on the threat and conducted attacks by aircraft when Árbenz did not leave office. 
The CIA dropped more leaflets as the aircraft departed.125  The Chief of the Political and 
Psychological Staff, Tracy Barnes stated: “I suppose it doesn’t really matter what the 
leaflets say,” he believed that the real message was the aerial attack itself.126  According 
to an editorialist, the subsequent leaflet drops were believed to be practice runs for 
bombing raids.127  Additional leaflets were dropped targeting Guatemalan military 
officers with an appeal for the officers to lead their forces against President Árbenz, and 
also claimed that Árbenz was preparing to dissolve the military and replace it with a 
citizen force.128  The propaganda directed at the Guatemalan officer corps had some 
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affect; an American advisor stated “a great number of the officers are extremely unhappy 
about the Communists in the government and the poor U.S.-Guatemalan relations.”129  
Though promising, the psychological campaign from January to the end of April in 1954 
to influence the Guatemalan officer corps was not achieving its intended purpose.130  
Also critical to the PSYOP strategy was radio. 
The CIA established the “Voice of Liberation” radio stations throughout the 
region surrounding Guatemala. The stations were able to operate on the same frequencies 
used by the Guatemalan Government, which allowed local stations to be preempted when 
necessary. Even though the Voice of Liberation Radio was actually positioned outside 
Guatemala, part of the deception was that it was located “deep in the Guatemalan 
jungle.”131  The CIA also trained three Guatemalans to operate a radio station in Florida 
to support their broadcast operations.132 Training the Guatemalans allowed the CIA to 
use them to conduct audience assessments of Guatemalan listeners. The CIA trained 
radio operators saw it as their duty to intimidate hardcore Marxist’s and Árbenz 
supporters, while influencing those who were neutral to oppose communism. The radio 
broadcasts also reinforced the message that Árbenz was preparing to dissolve the military 
and replace it with a citizen force.133 
On June 18, 1954, Carlos Castillo was inside Honduras with his invasion force. 
After dawn, Castillo and his forces drove their motorcade six miles into Guatemala at the 
direction of the CIA, and then halted their invasion of Guatemala.134  As Árbenz 
attempted to deal with the invasion diplomatically rather than militarily, the “Voice of 
Liberation” radio was reporting the “swift progress” made by Castillo’s forces.135  The 
radio stations appealed for citizens to support Castillo’s forces and proclaimed them as 
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their liberators. This played into the CIA’s strategy as Carlos Castillo and his Liberation 
Army “served as a psychological rather than military function.”136   
The operation relied on: 
psychological impact rather than on actual military strength, although it is 
upon the ability of the Castillo Armas effort to create and maintain the 
impression of very substantial military strength, and that the success of 
this particular effort primarily depends.137 
The perception and narrative that Aramas commanded a formidable force was critical to 
the desired psychological impact upon the Guatemalans. 
Rumor was also a powerful tool during the invasion. Rumor was spread that 
thousands of volunteers were joining Castillo as he advanced through Guatemala; this 
greatly disturbed the regime.138  To add to the confusion, the CIA established the “Voice 
of Liberation” radio stations throughout the region surrounding Guatemala. The stations 
were able to operate on the same frequencies used by the Guatemalan Government, 
which allowed local stations to be preempted when necessary. 
As the PSYOP campaign and the CIA air assaults continued to strike targets, 
including indigenous radio stations, support for Árbenz began to shrink and the masses 
grew “apathetic” towards Árbenz.139 The Catholic Church also contributed to Árbenz’s 
loss of support by informing the people of what they might lose under Árbenz’s rule.140  
Árbenz never had a counterpropaganda capability to rival the effects of the CIA’s 
PSYOP campaign and his best efforts to influence his followers hinged upon his appeal 
by radio, but his radio appeals were jammed.141 
In May 1954, the CIA’s propaganda efforts were successful in presenting 
Guatemala as a repressive regime. This was due to the reaction the Guatemalan 
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government, which revoked the freedom of speech and assembly. Independent 
newspapers and radio stations were also intimidated into closure.142  The same month, 
Guatemala received a shipment of Czech weapons aboard the MS Alfhem. This shipment 
of weapons from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic boosted the propaganda message 
that Guatemala was tied to the Soviets. The American press proclaimed that the Soviet 
threat did indeed exist in the Western Hemisphere. The Washington post stated: “it has 
arrived.” The United States Congress also believed that the threat was real; the House 
Speaker, John McCormack stated: “this cargo of arms is like an atom bomb placed in the 
rear of our backyard.”143  
Finally, on June 27, 1954, President Arbenz made the decision to surrender after 
losing only 15 soldiers with another 25 wounded.144  According to David Phillips, the 
CIA agent responsible for “Voice of Liberty” Radio, this came as a surprise. When 
President Árbenz gave his surrender speech, the CIA “expected him to tell his people that 
he had won.” The victory came as a surprise to Phillips because: “We thought we’d 
lost…we were so surprised by his departure.”145 
B. GUATEMALAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 
THE COUP 
Prior to launching the coup d’état, the perception of the U.S. Government and the 
American People towards Guatemala was largely negative. The United States 
Government held that the Guatemalan Government was communist in nature and the 
American people concurred because bipartisan Congressional leadership presented it to 
them; the intervention in Guatemala was “a bipartisan consensus policy.”146  With this 
bipartisan consensus, there was no opposition to action against Guatemala; the resolution 
for action in Guatemala passed the U.S. House with a vote of 372 to 0. This occurred at a 
time when the American People believed, through “a concerted campaign” that the Soviet 
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Union was no longer an ally, but now an “evil empire.” This was further enhanced by the 
public relations efforts of the United Fruit Company147 and the effort of public relations 
expert, Edward Bernays who labeled Guatemala as Communist regime in the 
Caribbean.148 
President Árbenz’s election to office was “convincing” even though his 
Revolutionary party had lost considerable popular support.149  The decrease in the 
Revolutionary party’s support indicated that there was an increased opposition to reforms 
from the landowners and capitalists.150  Both groups were opposed to the agricultural 
land reforms Árbenz enacted that took land away from the large plantations and 
corporations and gave it to the supportive peasantry, which included over 100,000 
families and 1.5 million acres.151  In addition, opposing President Árbenz were moderates 
who were in opposition to elements of his agenda as well as partisans from the pre-1944 
regime,152 and the Catholic Church, which believed that President Árbenz would 
undermine the authority and influence of the Church. President Árbenz’s most strident 
support came from the young Communists.153 
C. GUATEMALAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE 
COUP 
Immediately following the coup d’état, the perceptions of the United States 
Government and the American People towards Guatemala was more favorable after 
Carlos Castillo replaced President Árbenz. However, American journalists ultimately 
came to their own conclusion that the coup was: “to protect the corporate interests of the 
                                                 
147 Jonas, Battle for Guatemala, 33. 
148 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 84. 
149 Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla, Garrison Guatemala, 13. 
150 Ibid., 13. 
151 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 13. 
152 Nicholas Culather, Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952–1954 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc05.pdf. 
153 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 204. 
 31 
United Fruit Company.”154  Despite the regime change, the United Fruit Company 
benefited very little because of an antitrust lawsuit against the Company and the 
Company eventually ceased to exist by the late 1960s.155 
After accession to the Presidency, Carlos Castillo favored his powerful 
constituency, the landowners and political opportunists.156  As the CIA selection for the 
Presidency of Guatemala, the Guatemalans knew that the United States would not let 
Castillo fail.157  Carlos Castillo fell out of favor with the peasantry after he banned 
illiterates from voting, which affected nearly three quarters of the population, and when 
he rescinded the agricultural reform bill, Decree 900.158  Schlesinger and Kinzer best 
summed up the final outcome of the coup for the United States: 
Over the longer term, the coup gravely damaged American interests in 
Latin America. The gusto with which the United States had ended the 
Guatemalan revolution embittered many Latins, and strengthened deep-
seated anti-Americanism throughout the continent.159 
The United States got the regime change it wanted, but not the desired outcome.  
D. APPLICATION OF SMT TO GUATEMALA 
1. Leadership 
It was Árbenz’s land reforms, which ultimately brought the concerns of the 
United Fruit Company in Guatemala to the attention of the Dulles brothers, John Dulles 
the Secretary of State and Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, and ultimately, President 
Eisenhower, whom supported counterrevolutionary action against Jacobo Árbenz.160 
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The CIA began planning for the removal of President Jacobo Árbenz in August 
1953, less than a year before the coup was initiated.161 The CIA selected Carlos Castillo 
to lead the CIA funded Liberation Army because he was a military commander and the 
operation was a military operation.162  Castillo led a failed uprising in Guatemala during 
the 1950s and was well known in the Guatemalan exile community.163  He was the leader 
of the largest rebel group and had significant paramilitary and intelligence assets. 
However, he lacked combat experience.164  Castillo was also able to gain the backing of 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic in addition to the 
United States.165 
Critical to the success of Operations in Guatemala was the perception that the 
Liberation Army led by Castillo was capable of winning and that once it became 
committed to battle, that it was indeed winning. To achieve this effect, it was incumbent 
upon Castillo to “create and maintain the impression of a very substantial military 
strength.”166 This meant that Castillo had to portray the image of a competent military 
leader who was up to the task. With the support of the CIA, through the creation of the 
Liberation Army and the use of radio and air power, the perception presented was that 
Castillo was viewed as being in charge and taking Guatemala on his own. 
2. Ideological Packaging 
The decision for regime change in Guatemala was largely based on the land 
reforms President Árbenz enacted and how they affected the United Fruit Corporation. 
The Árbenz government was viewed as leftist based on its land reforms and the United 
States assumed wrongly that Árbenz was transforming Guatemala into a communist state 
and operating in concert with Moscow.167 
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Members of the Eisenhower administration, including the Dulles brothers, 
regarded these reforms as proof of Communist influence.168  Árbenz legalized the 
communist party;169 however, the reality was that their reach and influence in the 
government was minimal.170  However, this act, coupled with his agricultural reforms, 
drove the United States to take action against the perceived communist regime. 
Anti-communism became the narrative used against Árbenz by the United States. 
This was done through the print and broadcast media. The American television network, 
CBS broadcast a documentary titled “Red Rule in Guatemala,” which focused on the 
threat Guatemala posed to the Panama Canal. The Reader’s Digest, the Chicago Tribune, 
the Saturday Evening Post, and even The New York Times all printed articles that 
highlighted the Communist dangers that the Árbenz government posed to the United 
States.171  Even after Árbenz revealed the plot against him to the press, it was “dismissed 
as a Communist ploy.”172 
When economic sanctions were enacted against Guatemala by the United States, 
pressure was put on neighboring countries not to provide military and economic support. 
As a result, Guatemala was forced to seek alternate vendors for necessary military 
support.173  This meant that Guatemala had to order weapons from Czechoslovakia, 
which arrived via commercial shipping from Sweden on a vessel named the Alfhem; it 
carried 4,900 tons of weapons. The United States and the Liberation Army failed to 
interdict the vessel and the weapons were delivered to the Guatemalan military.174  Even 
though the CIA and Liberation Forces were unable to interdict the delivery, the United 
States was able to exploit the propaganda value of the Guatemalan government seeking 
support from a Communist country. President Eisenhower then called Guatemala “an 
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outpost of the communist dictatorship on the American continent” during a news 
conference.175  The United States Congress and American press followed suit declaring 
the Communist threat real to the Hemisphere.176 
3. Frames and Framing 
In the United States, Edward Bernays was a public relations consultant whose 
efforts worked to the benefit of the United Fruit Company and the United States’ effort to 
depose Árbenz. Bernays influenced liberal columnists to cover the United Fruit 
Company’s problems in Guatemala to raise attention and attack the Guatemalan 
government.177  Bernays was very effective at influencing American public opinion as 
was evidenced when an American writer and scholar visited Guatemala and found the 
media portrayal of Guatemala to be counter to what was being reported and challenged 
the narrative. Bernays continued the media assault on Guatemala by convincing The New 
York Post to write about “the growing dangers of communism in the Guatemalan 
government;” which consisted of a series of reports about the Guatemalan government. 
Bernays then organized several two-week “fact-finding” trips to the region with many 
reporters to keep the attention on Guatemala.178  Bernays used his connections with a 
liberal anti-communist publication called “The New Leader,” to get the United Fruit 
Company to sponsor public service announcements in the publication at rates higher than 
required for positive coverage, a practice that continued after the coup.179  The final 
result of Edward Bernays’ efforts was “an atmosphere of deep suspicion and fear in the 
United States about the nature and intentions of the Guatemalan government.”180  As a 
result of Bernays’ work, the United States came to oppose the Guatemalan regime. This 
allowed the United States government to proceed without interference or difficulty in 
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presenting its opposition to the government of Guatemala and facilitated the support of its 
neighbors in the Central American region. 
To define the problem as communism and identify those at fault in Guatemala, the 
United States needed to show that the Árbenz regime was the cause. The CIA used 
diagnostic framing through the Catholic Church to “turn Guatemalans against Arbenz”181 
during Catholic mass. The narrative used against the Árbenz regime by the Catholic 
Church then escalated into a prognostic narrative as Guatemalan clergy then warned that 
“a demonic force called communism was trying to destroy their homeland,” and called 
upon listeners to “rise as a single man against this enemy of God and country.”182  The 
narrative was reinforced through leaflets and radio broadcasts from CIA radio stations 
with programming known as the Voice of Liberation. The CIA trained Guatemalans to 
operate the radio stations, who were then able to conduct audience assessments to 
determine the composition of the listenership.183 By doing audience analyses, Voice of 
Liberation Radio was able to determine the composition of the target audience they 
sought to influence. Voice of Liberation sought to persuade the 60% of the neutral 
population to join those who were anti-communists or who were against the trend of 
moving towards communism. A key objective of the leaflet and radio campaign was to 
use a motivational narrative to create a divide between Árbenz and the Guatemalan Army 
to help facilitate the invasion by Castillo.184  The CIA did this by appealing directly to 
Guatemalan military officers and soldiers to rise up against Árbenz by claiming that he 
was going to replace the military with a militia force.185 
4. Resource Mobilization 
To ensure the overthrow of the Guatemalan government, the CIA had to maintain 
the necessary resources to achieve their goal. The CIA had to create, finance, and arm a 
liberation army and an air force to conduct combat operations against the Árbenz regime 
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to overthrow it. The CIA used a front company known as the International Armament 
Company (InterArmco) to provide rebel forces with Russian armaments that could not be 
linked to the United States and to give the impression that the Soviet Union was “trying 
to establish a foothold in the country.”186  InterArmco was not the only corporation 
giving support to the rebels. The United Fruit Company also agreed to support the rebels 
by providing them with weapons and the use of their train line to move weapons for the 
rebels in Guatemala. The United Fruit Company only asked that they receive back the 
land that Árbenz took in his land reforms. The CIA recruited Carlos Castillo Armas who 
was popular in the anti-Árbenz movement and had been involved in an earlier overthrow 
attempt that failed. Carlos Castillo Armas was given $3 million from the CIA to fund the 
coup and was the man the United Fruit Company worked with to support the invasion.187  
Castillo was not a great military leader, but he was good enough to make the operation 
successful. 
The Liberation Army was manned by Guatemalan exiles188 and formed in 
neighboring Nicaragua and Honduras in preparation for the invasion.189  The Army 
served more of a “psychological rather than military function”190 when Castillo 
“invaded” Guatemala. The Air Force was also created from local Guatemalans as well as 
from the CIA’s own employees of the Civil Air Transport Company, and would be 
critical to the success of the operation.191  Efforts were made to give the appearance that 
the liberation forces were not American: “participants would acknowledge that if some of 
the Guatemalan rebel aircraft had been shot down, the surviving pilots would have been 
found—speaking Chinese.192 
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5. Opportunism and Adaptation 
In Guatemala, the CIA and Carlos Castillo were able to capitalize on several 
existing conditions, which allowed them to gain the advantage. Guatemala had a 
fractured government with a leader, Jacobo Árbenz, who did not have the support of the 
most influential population. The capitalists, the landowners, and the Catholic Church 
disliked Árbenz, as did many moderates who opposed parts of his agenda. However, 
more troubling for Árbenz was the relationship that he had with his military. This was 
because Árbenz never replaced the military’s leadership with new leaders who were 
sympathetic to Árbenz’s agenda and a secret anti-Árbenz element existed in the 
military.193  The CIA and invasion forces, through their PSYOP campaign, attempted to 
put a wedge between Árbenz and his officers in hopes of exploiting this vulnerability 
during the coup.194  It did not achieve its desired effect, but it did create an extreme 
unhappiness about the Communists in the Guatemalan government and the poor U.S.-
Guatemalan relations. 
6. Presence, Tactics and Deeds 
The United States was effective in overthrowing the Árbenz regime through the 
integration of PSYOP, air, and land forces in conjunction with the diplomatic actions of 
the United States. The mix of strategies used in Guatemala added to the perception that 
the invasion force sent to liberate Guatemala was larger and more powerful than it was in 
reality and demonstrated the effectiveness of the multiple assets employed. It proved 
effective enough to persuade President Jacobo Árbenz to resign as President only 15 days 
after the commencement of the invasion by the liberation forces.  
The preemptive psychological warfare messaging was critical to creating the 
perception of an impending invasion. Air operations were essential in disseminating 
leaflets and then reinforcing the messaging by conducting the very attacks that were 
announced in the leaflets.195  When President Eisenhower enquired about the 
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effectiveness of a coup without aircraft, Allen Dulles, the CIA director, advised the 
President that their chances were “about zero.”196  The total number of aircraft used in 
the liberation was about a dozen and included three bombers.197  They were effective and 
became the main rebel activity during the invasion.198  The Liberation Army was small in 
number, only 200 members, but effective for the task for which they had been created. 
After invading Guatemala, the PSYOP campaign, broadcasts and rumor, gave the 
liberation army more legitimacy than the force could have achieved on its own. 
E. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
After applying the SMT factors to the Guatemalan coup, it can be determined that 
the coup was a successful because the United States Government took the position that 
President Árbenz was a communist and his agricultural reform was a result of his politics 
based on communist ideology. One of President Árbenz’s actions was to allow the 
legalization of the Communist Party in Guatemala, which allowed Marxists to hold 
important positions in the Guatemalan Government, including positions involving the 
agricultural reform bill. 
The Arbenz land acts fit the profile of what a communist government would enact 
by taking land and redistributing it to the people. When President Árbenz allowed the 
legalization of the Communist Party in Guatemala, Marxists began to occupy important 
positions in the Guatemalan Government. It was still difficult to prove that President 
Árbenz was a communist. This was confirmed when the propaganda campaign that 
targeted the Guatemalan officer corps failed to achieve its goal of putting a wedge 
between President Árbenz and his Army officer corps. However, the propaganda did raise 
serious concerns that President Árbenz and his government were likely communists. An 
American advisor to the Guatemalan Army made the observation that Guatemalan 
officers were extremely unhappy about the communists in their government and the poor 
relations between Guatemala and the United States. 
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The operation to overthrow Árbenz began with a PSYOP campaign that was 
initiated seven weeks before the actual invasion force entered Guatemala. The PSYOP 
campaign began in Guatemala City when CIA aircraft dropped leaflets, which stated that 
there would be subsequent bombings unless President Árbenz quit. The PSYOP 
campaign also incorporated radio stations throughout the region and were able to 
broadcast on frequencies used by the Guatemalan government. 
The CIA established the “Voice of Liberation” radio stations throughout the 
region. The stations were able to operate on the same frequencies used by the 
Guatemalan Government, which allowed local stations to be preempted when necessary. 
President Árbenz never had an effective counterpropaganda capability to rival the effects 
of the CIA’s PSYOP campaign and his best efforts to influence his followers hinged upon 
his appeal by radio, however his radio appeals were jammed.199 
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The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) led by Daniel Ortega was 
responsible for an insurgency that overthrew Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in 
1979. As a result, Somoza was forced to cede control of the country to the Sandinista 
FSLN, flee Nicaragua, ultimately leading to Daniel Ortega’s rule. The United States 
became concerned with the rise of the Sandinistas during the Nicaraguan revolution 
because of the recent American experience with Communism in Cuba and Vietnam. 
Much of America’s foreign policy was directed against the spread and influence 
of communism and when Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 
1980, he enacted what became known as the “Reagan Doctrine.”  In the fight against 
communism, the Reagan Doctrine expanded the existing policies of resistance to Soviet 
influence to a policy of supporting groups that would fight governments that aligned with 
the Soviet Union.200 In Nicaragua, those were the anti-communist freedom fighters 
known as the Contras. President Reagan’s supporters stated that the President was: 
“performing a moral duty and fulfilling a strategic purpose.”201 
There were historical and diplomatic considerations important to Nicaragua as 
well. Cuba, under the leadership of Fidel Castro underwent a Communist revolution. This 
led to the U.S. strategic failure at the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis. The 
United States had poorly handled Cuba from the very beginning and Cuba’s success 
against the United States was inspiring revolution throughout Latin America. With the 
popularity of revolution, the United States and other Latin countries did not wish to see 
another “Cuba” happen in the region.202  The United States was also only half a decade 
past the end of the Vietnam War. The wounds of that war were still visible and the 
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rebuilding of the American Military was ongoing. The will of the American people to go 
to war again was low.203  These considerations made the use of indigenous guerrilla 
forces with support from the United States more appealing through the lens of the Reagan 
Doctrine.  
In Nicaragua, Sandinista rule was controversial with the middle and upper classes 
because they feared the Sandinistas would impose a “Soviet-style state and economy.”204 
When the Sandinistas took control of Nicaragua, President Carter offered 
economic assistance in an effort to promote a more right-leaning government.205  
However, despite assistance from the United States, the Sandinistas sought arms and 
military support abroad from Socialist Bloc.206  This created an opportunity for the 
United States to label the Sandinistas as communists to gain support against them. It was 
an unpopular idea to use direct action against the Sandinistas, but the use of a proxy 
force, in this case the Contras, was consistent with the Reagan Doctrine. 
In 1978, President Carter was concerned with the growing opposition in 
Nicaragua against the Somoza regime, which the United States had placed in power in 
1932.207  President Carter’s policies were derived from the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, 
which holds, in part, that uncontrolled change in Central America was bad for the 
hemisphere.208  President Carter tried to undermine the Nicaraguan Revolution and the 
gains made by the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) beginning in 1979, an 
effort continued by two subsequent Presidential administrations seeking to halt the 
Sandinista rule in Nicaragua and returning to a democracy.209  Within 6 months of the 
Sandinista victory in 1979, President Carter authorized the CIA to support political 
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opponents of the Sandinistas, including influence operations.210  After President Reagan 
entered office in 1980, his administration departed from the policies of his predecessor. 
Reagan strongly opposed the spread of communism and Soviet influence and 
sought to roll their effects back throughout the world. There was a belief that if the 
United States could not stop the spread of communism so close to home, then it could not 
effectively act elsewhere in the world when necessary. National Security Advisor Robert 
McFarlane declared, “We had to win this one.”211  While this belief persisted in the 
administration, the President could not gain support from the people of the United States 
to send American troops into Nicaragua so soon after the Vietnam War; the solution 
would require covert means. Finding it necessary to get U.S. Congressional support for 
any meaningful action in Nicaragua, the Reagan administration, through the U.S. State 
Department, established a “white propaganda” operation.212  The program was focused 
on building popular support within the U.S. Congress to fund of the Contras; it was not 
created to build popular support within Nicaragua against the Sandinistas.213 
Another method used by the United States to influence support against the 
Sandinistas was the insertion of articles and opinion pieces in major newspapers. These 
papers included The Washington Post, The New York Times, and other major papers in 
Europe and Latin America. The common theme of the articles was that extremists were 
leading the revolution and centrists were to be favored.214 An article by Marlise Simons 
from the Washington Post, said the following: 
Despite the revolutionary euphoria of the past month, the first signs of 
opposition to Nicaragua’s new government are coming from the extreme 
left, and not as widely anticipated, from the businessmen. At the same 
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time, the government’s first act of political impatience has been to expel 
some 60 Latin American Trotskyists whom it charged with being 
“counterrevolutionaries” and “creating problems for the Sandinista 
revolution.215 
In March of 1981, President Reagan signed the National Security Decision 
Directive (NSDD) number 17, which authorized the CIA to conduct covert action against 
the Sandinistas.216  A presidential finding following the NSDD signing stated “the U.S. 
aim was merely to interdict the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador”217  The 
NSDD, in fact, authorized paramilitary operations by the CIA between 1981–1988; 
military operations beginning in 1982, consisting primarily of U.S. Army Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), including psychological operations; and a propaganda war 
waged by the CIA supported by the U.S. Army PSYOP elements.218 
The CIA supported the Contras, with fiscal and military support to overthrow the 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The United States had four objectives in supporting 
the Contras against the Sandinistas. First, get the Sandinistas to stop their support for 
insurgencies in the region. Second, disrupt Sandinista support for guerrillas in El 
Salvador. Third, disrupt the internal consolidation in Nicaragua by the FSLN and fourth, 
bring the Sandinistas closer to negotiation.219 
The United States military positioned special operations forces in various Central 
American countries in a series of maneuvers intended to make the Sandinistas fear the 
possibility of an invasion by the United States and to execute PSYOP.220  The CIA 
supported the La Prensa newspaper, which was owned and operated by the Chamorro 
family and a symbol of opposition to the Sandinistas.221  The CIA also supported a 
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Contra run radio station in San Jose, Costa Rica, known as Radio Impacta and Radio 
Católica. The Sandinistas did not have the capacity to stop the broadcast propaganda 
originating from outside Nicaragua; however they were effective inside their own 
borders. The FSLN government simply ignored radio stations broadcasting outside the 
country, but exerted their authority over the stations broadcasting inside Nicaragua.222 
Supporting the Contras remained a priority for President Reagan. However, it had 
ultimately become unpopular with the U.S. Congress, which led to Congress passing the 
Boland Amendment in 1985, ending assistance to the Contras. This ultimately led to the 
Iran-Contra scandal in 1986 when the Reagan administration sought innovative funding 
outside of Congress to continue support for the Contras. Under the Presidency of George 
H. W. Bush, the Contras “ceased to be regarded as a viable military and political 
option.”223  However, the Bush administration supported their continuation as a force in 
the event that future Nicaraguan elections would not deliver the desired outcome for the 
United States.224 
The deteriorating economic conditions in Nicaragua and the continual loss of life 
due to the war with the contras ended in 1990, when Violeta Chamorro was elected 
President of Nicaragua, defeating Daniel Ortega and the FSLN.225  The majority of 
Nicaraguans disliked the Contras. Accordingly, the Nicaraguans elected Chamorro 
because she promised to end the draft and to improve the economy within 100 days of 
being elected.226 The United States also lifted the economic sanctions against Nicaragua. 
Twelve years after the revolution began; the Sandinistas were no longer in control and the 
United Sates ultimately got what it wanted; democracy in Nicaragua, but it came at a 
great cost of life for the Nicaraguan people and the reputation of the United States. 
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B. NICARAGUAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 
THE COUP 
In the United States, the idea of going to war in Central America was not a 
popular idea as a result of the Vietnam debacle.227  President Reagan was the driving 
force behind the United States’ involvement in Nicaragua, but he needed to get the 
support of Congress and the American people. To do this, he had to inform and to gain 
support domestically for Nicaragua and implement a public affairs action plan “to 
educate and heighten the perception of the people regarding the situation in Central 
America and the dangers posed by the Marxist/Leninist government of Nicaragua.”228 
In Nicaragua, the FSLN had much sympathy and support from the rural citizens, 
the poor in the cities, students and workers. This support materialized when the FSLN 
began to focus on politics rather than being primarily a military organization.229  The 
middle and upper classes feared the Sandinistas would impose a Soviet-style state and 
economy, though the FSLN never did.230  The FSLN had significant support from 
grassroots groups that aided them in overthrowing Somoza.231 
C. NICARAGUAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE 
COUP 
In the United States, the State Department initially presented an image of the 
Contras as “Freedom Fighters,” who were made up of peasantry, farmers, vendors and 
shopkeepers that opposed the Somoza regime whom supported democracy and opposed 
communism and revolution.232  This was a noble image, but the reality was that the 
Contras were committing horrific attacks against civilians while being portrayed as 
freedom fighters. 
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The Contras failed to articulate their views on issues and it was considered by 
Edgar Chamorro, that “If the Contras ever took power, they would simply replace the 
communists with their law-and-order regime and no one would be better off…I am now 
concerned that the contra cause which I have given up two years of my life offers 
Nicaragua nothing but a return to the past.”233  This was an opinion of the Contras also 
shared by members of the U.S. Congress. Congressman Richard Gephardt stated: “They 
are not a credible democratic alternative to the Sandinistas.”234  In light of these 
concerns, the Contras were also linked to numerous illegal activities and corrupt practices 
that ranged from fraud to drug trafficking. 
Ultimately, it was the unpopularity of the Contras in the United States that led to 
restrictions on supporting them. Between 1982 and 1983, the U.S. Congress passed a 
series of amendments that were collectively known as the Boland Amendment, named 
after Congressman Edward P. Boland.235  The Boland Amendment “explicitly prohibited 
funds from being spent by the United States government for the overthrow of the 
government of Nicaragua.”236  Ultimately, the amendment would lead to the Reagan 
administrations’ decision to secure alternate funding through the sale of weapons to the 
Iranians in the Iran-Contra affair. 
The attitude toward the war and the United States after nine years was collected in 
a survey conducted in the Nicaraguan capitol city of Managua by Envio Magazine in June 
of 1988.237  The survey was taken in the final months of the Reagan administration and 
after the Iran-Contra affair. 
In the survey, 47% of the respondents blamed the United States and/or the 
Contras for the troubles in Nicaragua; 16% blamed the FSLN; 8% blamed the governing 
party; 6% blamed it on a lack of democracy, and 2% blamed totalitarianism or 
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communism.238  When asked about the United States, 85% were opposed to the United 
States supporting the Contras while 9% were in support of it. Of those results, 90% of 
those opposed to the Contras were from the upper and middle classes and “young,” while 
those in support of the Contras were “older” and made up about 17%.239 
The survey indicated that 62% with anti-Sandinista sentiments believed the 
United States’ policies were bad for Nicaragua and only 8% believed they were good for 
Nicaragua. The survey indicated that there was a desire for reconciliation with the 
Contras through the political process and a desire for the United States to cease support 
for the Contras.240  This is consistent with the voter outcome of 1990 that elected Violeta 
Chamorro as the President of Nicaragua. 
In 1989, Hemisphere Initiatives conducted their own survey and found that the 
image of the Contras was 57% negative and only 10% positive. When they looked at who 
was responsible for the problems in Nicaragua, 47% blamed the United States and 39% 
blamed the FSLN.241 
The information gather from the surveys indicate that the United States failed to 
achieve the perception necessary to vilify the FSLN and bolster support for the Contras. 
This was most likely due to Contra atrocities and human rights abuses, which countered 
messages urging support for the Contras and not the FSLN.242  It is inconceivable that 
any population in any given political system would consciously give up the status quo for 
another that is more barbaric. The United States did not provide a credible message that 
was accompanied by the actions of the forces it trained and equipped to achieve its 
desired end state. Additionally, by not offering a message of reconciliation for the 
population and the Sandinistas, a significant number of people were already immune to 
the messaging. 
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D. APPLICATION OF SMT TO NICARAGUA 
1. Leadership 
Sometimes leaders rise from tragedy; this is the case with Violeta Chamorro. She 
was the loyal wife and widow of one of the most important political figure, Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro, the editor at the La Prensa. She was of the proper pedigree and had the family 
resource of the La Prensa to counter and confront the FSLN. Indirectly receiving support 
from the United States and the CIA, Chamorro never took direct orders from them. This 
allowed the United States to use an existing asset with credibility rather than try to create 
one that probably would have lacked credibility. 
Violeta Chamorro was originally part of the junta that followed the Somoza 
government, but resigned because it went beyond just overthrowing the Somoza 
government. After leaving, she became a critic of the Sandinistas and attacked them in 
the media through the La Prensa and subsequently asked to become politically involved 
as the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.243 
Violeta Chamorro presented herself as a “good traditional wife” and denied being 
a feminist. She presented herself as an exemplary mother of four children despite their 
internal differences on politics.244  La Prensa was used to frame Violeta as an exemplary 
mother and; if “Maternal love had triumphed over political divisions, and if it could work 
for Dona Violet’s immediate family, why not for the whole Nicaraguan family?”245  
Violeta Chamorro used the imagery of family to undermine FSLN support by claiming 
that voting for the FSLN would continue “obligatory military service and the suffering of 
mothers.”246 
Chamorro only wore white, a symbol of purity. Many believed that she did this to 
evoke images of the Virgin Mary, and in a country like Nicaragua that was 
predominantly Catholic, it was a powerful symbol. She also played to the martyr aspect 
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with the loss of her husband, just as Mary had lost son.247  These perceptions of Violeta 
Chamorro resonated with war weary Nicaraguans who just wanted the conflict to end; 
she was elected President of Nicaragua in 1990. 
2. Ideological Packaging 
President Reagan believed that Cuba was responsible for the conflict in El 
Salvador and that Cuba was using Nicaragua as the “conduit” to El Salvador.248  
President Reagan authorized covert action, but the Cubans had to be at the center of any 
explanation used to justify covert action.249  Cuba invoked a familiar image of what 
Communist revolution looked like and was still recent in the American experience. The 
FSLN easily fit into the image associated with Communist revolutionaries. 
In overthrowing the Somoza government, the actions of the FSLN were consistent 
with the narrative used by the Reagan administration. The FSLN was portrayed as 
puppets of the Soviet Union, racist, human rights violators, responsible for drug problems 
in the United States, and linked to worldwide terrorism.250  At the same time, the 
administration pushed the image of the Contras as freedom fighters; necessary to 
American interests in Nicaragua, and that they must be the recipients of American aid. 
These narratives were disseminated by print in La Prensa and also by radio broadcast. 
These portrayals of the Contras were often difficult to accept due to the atrocities that 
they were known to have committed. 
3. Frames and Framing 
The Reagan administration framed the Contra War through a “White Propaganda” 
program directed internally at the U.S. Congress to obtain fiscal and material support for 
the Contras. Without U.S. support, the Contras would not have been able to take action 
against the Sandinistas. Framing conducted inside Nicaragua by the CIA and the Contras 
was done through the use of print and broadcast. The Nicaraguan paper, La Prensa, 
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“contributed to the polarization of Nicaraguan politics,” as a voice of opposition to the 
Sandinista government while supporting the Contras.251  Much of what La Prensa printed 
was broadcast on Radio Católica as well, but it added additional “pseudoreligious 
teachings that pitted Sandinistas against Christianity.”252 
4. Resource Mobilization  
The United States military positioned special operations forces in various Central 
American countries in a series of maneuvers intended to create a high degree of visibility 
in the region and signal the seriousness of the United States’ position against revolution 
in the region. The U.S. Army supported the military PSYOP effort in the region through 
military exercises to make the Sandinistas fear the possibility of an invasion by the 
United States.253 
The CIA supported La Prensa, a paper owned and operated by the Chamorro 
family that was a symbol of opposition to the Sandinistas.254  The La Prensa newspaper 
published about 55,000 copies daily for a population of nearly 3 million and reached 
primarily the urban upper and the middle classes.255  La Prensa “contributed to the 
polarization of Nicaraguan politics”256 and was a voice of opposition to the Sandinista 
government and in support of the Contras. The publication was never taken seriously as 
an informative newspaper and was more of a tabloid than a legitimate newspaper; it was 
consistently irresponsible, sensational, poorly written and edited, and frequently 
inaccurate.”257  The credibility of La Prensa was very low due to its blatant support for 
the United States and the Contras, and Nicaraguans called for a ““real” opposition 
newspaper, as it was obvious that La Prensa was externally manipulated and full of half-
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truths.”258  However, the publication was able to capitalize on the fact that it was 
regularly censored and occasionally shut down by the Sandinista government. La Prensa 
was able to use the Sandinista reaction as part of their strategy. By writing and publishing 
stories that were critical of the FSLN, La Prensa knew they would be censored and that it 
would demonstrate that freedom of the press under the Sandinistas was a myth.259 
The CIA supported Radio Impacta, a Contra-run radio station in San Jose, Costa 
Rica, and Radio Católica, a station in Nicaragua run by the Catholic Church whose 
narrative was also critical of the Sandinistas.260 The Voice of America radio program run 
by the United States Information Service also supported broadcast efforts to counter the 
Sandinistas government.261 
Radio Católica “carried frequent appeals that young men resist the draft,” and 
provided opposition groups with a “single point of access to a potentially broad-based 
popular following.”262  Radio Católica, like La Prensa, was accused of receiving CIA 
funding by the Sandinistas, but the evidence was weak.263  According to Bob Woodward, 
the CIA was going to fund Archbishop Obando, but was instructed not to by U.S. Senator 
Moynihan who stated that the Archbishop was a “moral force down there, and under no 
conditions can he be compromised.”264  Regardless, aid was covertly provided, and later 
discovered to come from sources connected to Oliver North. 
5. Opportunism and Adaptation 
The CIA leveraged existing organizations inside Nicaragua such as the Catholic 
Church, which was an obvious choice since much of the Nicaraguan population identified 
itself as Catholic.265  In Nicaragua, the Church experienced a split in its ranks. The clergy 
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and nuns tended to side with the Sandinistas and were often referred to as the “popular 
Church,” whereas the upper strata of the Church, under the leadership of Archbishop 
Miguel Obando, tended to oppose the Sandinistas and the brutality of the FSLN, and 
utilized Radio Católica to speak out against the FSLN and Sandinistas.266 Much of what 
Radio Católica broadcast was repetitious of what La Prensa had printed.267 
6. Presence, Tactics and Deeds 
Militarily, the United States committed forces in neighboring countries for 
psychological effect, but it was the Contras that executed the actual military operations. 
Unfortunately, the actions of the Contras were more violent and destructive than those of 
the FSLN. Despite the propaganda exclaiming the Contras to be freedom fighters, they 
were not, and their own actions did more to hamper their effort than anything the FSLN 
did. 
The publication La Prensa was also used by the CIA because of its established 
role in Nicaraguan media and for the recognized leadership of the publication—Violeta 
Chamorro. The Sandinistas often found themselves at odds with the La Prensa paper, 
which openly attacked the revolution and the government. The tactic used by La Prensa 
was to get itself censored by the government, thus proving that the FSLN was not 
permitting freedom of the press. This placed the Sandinistas in the difficult position of 
balancing censorship with reaction from the La Prensa. However, the FSLN leadership 
saw censorship as “a necessary evil.”268 
The United States also used magazines and newspapers to place articles and 
opinion pieces to influence public opinion against the FSLN. The CIA and the Contras 
also used radio, specifically, Radio Católica inside Nicaragua; outside of the country they 
used Radio Impacto from Costa Rica. The FSLN understood the effectiveness of radio 
and dismantled all of the radio stations they could find inside the Nicaraguan borders. 
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However, they could not do anything about stations operating outside of Nicaragua and 
chose to ignore them. 
E. TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES 
After applying the SMT factors to Guatemala, it can be determined that the 
United States certainly portrayed the FSLN as communists and achieved regime change 
in Guatemala. However, the final outcome was not what the United States had hoped for. 
The FSLN policies and political positions were easily aligned with communism and the 
Reagan administration did not have difficulty in associating Cuba with the events that 
were taking place in El Salvador, while at the same time, blaming Nicaragua for aiding 
Cuban action in the region. Given the history of the Communist revolution in Cuba, it 
was not difficult to conjure the necessary themes that resonated with Americans and 
echoed with Nicaraguans. 
The United States was trying to keep Cuba from interfering in Central America 
and was concerned that Nicaragua was acting as a conduit for Cuba to operate in the 
region. As a result, Nicaragua became the focus of President Reagan who was trying to 
stem the spread of communism in the hemisphere. The United States made the decision 
to support the anti-communist Contra freedom fighters while portraying the Sandinistas 
as communists. When the FSLN received military weapons and support from the Soviet 
Bloc, the United States further used this act to justify actions. Even the middle and upper 
classes in Nicaragua feared the Sandinistas would impose a “Soviet-style state and 
economy.”269 
Information-shaping operations were initiated ahead of major combat operations. 
The Contras were trained to operate radio stations and all operations were accompanied 
by information shaping operations. The CIA supported La Prensa newspaper, which was 
owned and operated by the Chamorro family and was a symbol of opposition to the 
Sandinistas.270  The messages printed in the La Prensa were often broadcast on Radio 
Católica, as well, but often included “pseudoreligious teachings that pitted Sandinistas 
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against Christianity.”271  Radio Católica directly addressed the Catholic majority in 
Nicaragua and countered the “popular church” elements of the Catholic Church. This 
denied both the FSLN and the revolutionaries from monopolizing religion and solidifying 
their legitimacy. 
At the beginning of the revolution, the Sandinista narrative was primarily directed 
at the United States. The strategy took advantage of the fact that the American people 
were uninterested in sending troops to Nicaragua because of memories of Vietnam. More 
importantly, no other Latin American country would support American action to remove 
another Latin American government.272  Additionally, the Sandinistas incorporated three 
additional narratives to capitalize on their overall strategy.273  First, the Sandinistas used 
sympathetic clergymen and liberation theology to promote the revolution in partnership 
with religion; this was the “popular church.”274  Second, Nicaragua tried to portray the 
United States negatively for supporting the Contras; it was not difficult to show the 
atrocities committed by the Contra rebels. Third, the Sandinistas demonstrated 
“tokenism” by allowing the limited strategic appearance of freedoms that the Sandinistas 
did not wish to permit; these strategic tokenisms were primarily directed towards the 
middle and upper classes in an effort to allay their fears that the new government would 
adopt strict communist-like practices.275  The FSLN understood their own media and 
offered their own narrative to offset what CIA and the Contras presented. 
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In this chapter, each case study is compared against each other to determine what 
elements of the social movement theory are the most vital to establishing a narrative 
leading to regime change. Next, those elements are applied to test the validity of the 
hypotheses and answer the research question presented in the first chapter. Finally, a way 
ahead is presented in the forms of recommendations and areas for further study. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Leadership 
The prospective leader of a rebellion must have the leadership capability to lead 
followers and must be perceived as a legitimate and credible opponent to the current 
regime. The leader, preferably with a history, must be a figure that symbolizes the 
struggle against the existing regime and one who offers an alternative that is worthy of 
supporting and fighting for. An existing leader that can be co-opted and will support the 
guidance and direction of the sponsor orchestrating the regime change if the interests of 
the sponsor and the rebel leader overlap. Conditions should be shaped to ensure a long-
term, positive relationship between the rebels and the sponsor after the rebellion 
succeeds. This will help ensure that U.S. policy goals are ultimately achieved. 
2. Ideology 
To create a strong ideological packaging for regime change, all narratives and 
actions by the targeted regime should be attacked at every possible opportunity to 
maximize the perception that the unacceptable conditions within the country are the 
responsibility of the regime. Efforts should also focus on influence efforts abroad to 
highlight the unacceptable conditions within the targeted regime. 
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3. Framing 
Framing for action against the regime should escalate from the diagnostic to the 
motivational. Presenting the narrative in this fashion gives the target audience a natural 
evolution of action necessary to accomplish the intended behavioral change or action, and 
ultimately creates the necessary perception. Framing should be presented through 
legitimate outlets such as the media and established organizations, such as the Catholic 
Church. 
4. Resource Mobilization 
Rebel forces require significant material and fiscal resources as well as training 
and facilities. Whenever possible, the rebel forces should use established and legitimate 
networks inside the country to facilitate movement of personnel and supplies. Sufficient 
support needs to exist domestically in the United States for action in a particular country 
before any efforts start in the targeted country. If support is not secured, the chances for 
success will be extremely low. Public support is not necessary for covert operations, 
however selected members of Congress must be briefed and must approve the covert 
action. 
5. Opportunism and Adaptation 
Leaders and planners of regime change must be flexible and always look for new 
opportunities and then act quickly on them to support the overall campaign. Using the 
regimes’ own laws, bureaucracy, and narrative against itself in the public domain can be 
highly effective. 
6. Presence, Tactics and Deeds 
Presence, tactics, and deeds should be started early and selected specifically for 
the intended target audience. They must also be integrated and mutually supporting of 
each other for maximum effectiveness and must support the narrative of the rebel forces. 
If there is a disconnect between what the rebel forces say and what they actually do, 
credibility could be lost and the ability to gain support could weaken or fail altogether. 
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7. Other Factors 
The United States needs to consider carefully the criteria it uses to intervene in the 
internal affairs of other countries to change a regime. In two of the cases, the reasons 
were economic: the welfare of a corporation and oil. In the third case, the reason was 
ideological. When the United States commits itself to action, it needs to ensure that its 
actions are consistent with its message and that its message is consistent with its values. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
The validity of the hypotheses were tested with the following results: 
 H1: The ideology behind the anti-regime must be broadly accepted and 
perceived as legitimate. 
 Yes. In the three cases, communist expansion was the reason why it was 
necessary for the United States to take action. All of the actions in each of 
the case studies were predicated on the notion that there was a threat, and 
that threat was defined as communism. Communism was an easily 
identifiable existential threat for the era of the case studies; today, 
Islamism could easily be used to replace communism as the ideological 
framework. 
 
 H2: The ability to control perception is dependent on the ability to 
leverage existing grievances and exploit regime vulnerabilities. 
 Yes. Each case study showed an element that had some form of grievance 
against the regime. The grievances in each of the case studies were co-
opted by the United States to bolster its own narrative and influence 
perceptions. 
 
 H3: Information-shaping operations should precede major combat 
operations against the regime. 
 Yes. In all three cases, information-shaping operations were executed well 
in advance of combat operations. 
 
 H4: IO should target respected host-nation communicators who are 
willing and capable of disseminating the themes. 
 Yes. In each case, respected and reputable communicators were used to 
disseminate themes and narratives. In some instances, the communicators 
willingly cooperated with U.S. and rebels forces. In other instances, 
communicators were bribed to get them to cooperate. This can obviously 




 H5: The legitimacy of the enemy’s narrative must be undermined. 
 Yes. In two of the cases: Iran and Guatemala, their narratives were quickly 
undermined and the U.S. narratives became dominant. In the case of 
Nicaragua, the FSLN had an established narrative and the means of 
dissemination that proved to be difficult to undermine. This was most 
likely because the United States failed to ensure its own actions supported 
its own narrative. Words were not synchronized with deeds. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that Military Information Support Operations (MISO) units 
exploit the insights in the case studies for the shaping of perceptions of foreign target 
audiences since within the Department of Defense (DOD), MISO is the main tool for 
conducting influence operations. As a SOF element, MISO should not be limited to 
influence operations defined solely as attribution and delayed attribution. The non-
attribution influence operations proved to be an effective means to conduct influence 
operations in special warfare. For example, in Iran, the CIA launched a completely covert 
psychological campaign against Mossadeq. As a result of their endeavor, the CIA 
controlled the Iranian people’s perception of their faltering government that led to the 
overthrow of Mossadeq. 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following topics are presented for consideration for additional research: 
 Legal Authorities required for the U.S. DOD forces, particularly for 
MISO, to conduct activities to support regime change and other activities 
short of a “named” operation. 
 Examination of current force structure and training of military forces 
responsible for conducting influence operations to identify strengths and 
weaknesses and capabilities and shortcomings. 
 Applying the methodology of this thesis to other forms of special warfare 
outside of regime change. The case studies presented in this thesis all 
focused on regime change, which does not always have to be the desired 
outcome. For example, in the case of the CIA’s involvement in the Tibet-
China conflict, the non-attribution influence operations conducted were 
designed to enhance Tibetan resistance against Chinese occupation, and 
not necessarily to overthrow the ruling regime.   
 Examining the relationship between the CIA and the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and their roles and capabilities in 
promoting regime change. Specifically, looking at which organization is 
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best suited for influencing and shaping operations in support of U.S. 
national security and policy objectives. 
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